The Psychology of Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): Its Context, Nature, and Historical Significance by Leary, David E.
University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Psychology Faculty Publications Psychology
1982
The Psychology of Jakob Friedrich Fries
(1773-1843): Its Context, Nature, and Historical
Significance
David E. Leary
University of Richmond, dleary@richmond.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/psychology-faculty-
publications
Part of the Other Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leary, David E. "The Psychology of Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843): Its Context, Nature, and Historical Significance." Storia E
Critica Della Psicologia 3, no. 2 (1982): 217-48.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JAKOB FRIEDRICH FRIES 
( 1773-1843): ITS CONTEXT, 
NATIJRE, AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
DAVID E. LEARY 
University of New Hampshire 
Most German philosophers in the early nineteenth century 
were devoted, to the idealistic « completion » of Immanuel 
Kant's critical philosophy. A few independent philosophers, how-
ever, were preoccupied with the elaboration of a non-idealistic, 
and less speculative, conclusion to Kant's thought. Among the 
earliest opponents of the speculativ~ idealists was Jakob Frie-
d~ich Fries (1773-1843), a philosopher of wide-ranging inte-
rests who might have had a much greater impact upon the 
course of German philosophy had his liberal political affilia-
tions not curtailed his academic career. As it was, his influence 
was considerable anyway. One aspect of this influence is of 
particular interest: in his reaction against idealism, and in his 
own « completion » of Kant, Fries laid the foundation for the 
development and acceptance of psychology as an independent 
science. 
Like the idealists, Fries acknowledged Kant as his most im-
portant predecessor. In fact, he claimed that he alone was the 
true follower of Kant since he alone had developed the ,critical 
basis rather than the speculative implications of Kant's philoso-
phy. Maintaining that knowledge of the transcendent is impossi-
ble, Fries rejected the attempts of the idealists to reduce rea-
lity to a system of absolute truths. Instead he concentrated, as 
did Kant, upon the discovery of the critical bases of know-
ledge. Methodologically, he relied upon analitical, descriptive, 
and deductive procedures rather than the constructive metaphy-
sical reasoning of the idealists. In the course of his efforts, he 
contributed new procedures and distinctions to the critical phi-
losophy, and he came to the conclusion that psychology is the 
The preparation of this research article was supported by a grant from the 
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funclamehtal science and ihe foundation of philosophy. Having 
established. the critical foundation of khowledge by means of 
psychology~ he' proceeded, as Kant had intended, to develop a 
system of metaphysics which, he claimed, remained within the 
limits of human understanding. He also developed the 
« psychic anthropology » by which he hoped to establish psycho-
logy upon a steady and lasting foundation. Through all these 
endeavors, he brought to the fore the conceptual possibility of. 
a scientific psychology. 
THE RELATION OF FRIES AND HIS WORK TO EARLY 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY 
Fries began his philosophical ruminations while a student at 
the Moravian Academy- in Herrenhut 1• From 1792 to 1795, 
he was taught Kantian philosophy as interpreted by Karl Leon-
hard Reinhold. Reinhold (1971) stressed the p,rinciple of con-
sciousness as the immediate and irreducible fact of philosophy. 
He also emphasized that the goal of philosophy was to give a 
descriptive accouht of consciousness, or a «phenomenology». 
That wh1ch is a priori in consciousness, Reinhold maintained, 
cannot be proven; it can only be discovered and described. 
These tenets of Reinhold had a very significant influence upon 
Fries's thought, but Fries was not completely satisfied with 
Reinhold's .interpretation of Kant. For that reason, Fries began 
his own critical .reaqing of Kant's works, seeking to discover 
not only what Kant 4imself·had saia: but, more importantly, 
hdw Kant had come .to hiS conclusions. 'fhus, from the very 
beginning wh~n 'Fries was f1rst attracted to philosophy (and 
away from the dogmatic sys~em of the Moravians), it was the 
fundamental issue of methodology that interested Fries. 
This interest was further' developed when Fries left the Mora-
vians in 1795 and went to Leipzig to study philosophy. There 
he came under the influence of Ernst Platner (1772; 2d rev. 
ed., 1790), a philosopher with medical and psycholpgical inter-
ests who. stressed the importance of empiricism in the form of 
·self-observation. Platner thus not only reinforced Reinhold's si-
1 The biographical details regarding Fries have been gathered primarily from 
Henke (i867J and. Eggeling (1878). 
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mjlar empha.sjs· upqn self-observat!on, ,he "al~o contributed ~o 
the psyc;hplogical so}utio,n of Fries'~ inqeasjng ~9t.icerp 51~out 
the critical justification of t~e ,critical method 1ts~lf. f..lso at 
Leipzig, Fries came into co.o.ttict w_ith the ~hought of .Friedrich 
Heinrich Jacqbi (1787; 2d ed., 1~15.1. Jacopi's philosophy 
of faith ~nd feeling corroqqrated _;tl;ie pie~fstic infl"\!ence 'Yhich 
the Moravians h_~d ,had ~pop. Fries. F~icrs 1s conv,mction that 
knowledge is ultimately based upon a feeling, or immediat<:: 
cognition, and .that the no~menal existence 'of the t~lqgs wpich 
appear to us can only be- ~Qnfirmed l:>Y faith, js a Cb11seq,uenc~ 
of this dual heritage of Pietism and Jacobian philosophy. 
From Jacobi, too, came another reinforcemeJ?~ of ~he impqrtance 
of self-observation. This theme, which was to, be· central to 
Fries's psychologkal development of Kant's critica( pbil~~ophy, 
can thus be traced to the combined influence of Reit;iliold, Plat-
n~r, and Jaco.bi. Despi~e Fries's objection to cert!).in a~pects 
of the thougl;it of each of these philosophers, it can therefore 
be ~aid that the positive basis of Fries's « corppletioµ >? of 
Kant was pi:ovided, by Reinhold, Platner, and Jacobi. 
The negative basis - that against wJ:iich Fries reacted at 
the beginning of his philosophical d~v,elopment - was the i<lea; 
listic philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (17~4). 'Fries.. beca-· 
me well acquainti;;d with thi~ philosophical system in 1797 af~ 
ter he transfe,rreP, .to Jena ~xplicitly in orQ.e~ t<? stupy wjih 
Fichte. From the start .Fichfe's specula.tive discourses aroµsed 
Fries's opp_osition. Fries habitually retyrned t9- his room ~fter 
Fichte's lectures and wrote point-by-point requtt,als. This. pr~cti­
ce in written polemic served Eries w~ll when'iii 1803 l;,e·wrqte 
Reinhold, Fichte,._ und Schelling, his very ~Hectfve,. di~tribe 
against the id~alistic tendencies in post-Kantiim pljilosophJl 
This work brougpt Fries a good deal of notice ,and, a rep11t,a-
tion as one of the more brilliant up-and-coming young philoso-
phers. . , , 
Well before that . .time, however, Frie~ U 79-S_a, b, c, cl, e) 
had already established the col).structive basis of his. later w9rk 
in a series of five artis;les. As a portept ?f 'thiqgs }O colll}!,, a}l 
these articles dealt with psycpology and, to varying degrc::.es, 
with the issue of the relation between _psychology, met.aphy-
sics, and the critical philosophy. The ;most significant of th~se 
articl~, " Dbet 4as Verhaltnis der empirischen Psy<;hclogie 
zur Metaphysik" .(Qn the Relation of EmpiricaLP~ycllolog~ Fo 
Metaphysics), provides an excellent summary of'-Fr~es'& philoso,-
, ~ 
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.i>hical program. Fries's later wr1tmgs, particularly his major 
works, ehiborate the themes he first expressed in this article. 
Thus, at the age of twenty-five, Fries had already developed 
his own unique philosophical viewpoint. Though historically re-
lated to the thought of Kant, Reinhold, Platner, and Jacobi, 
this viewpoint was a singular departure from the various systems 
of these philosophers. We shall examine its methodological 
and doctrinal innovations in the next section, and its psychologi-
cal tenets in the section after that. Here we shall continue to 
outline the history of Fries's life and individual works. 
Following his polemical tract, Reinhold, Fichte und Schel-
ling, Fries published two early book-length expositions of his 
thought, first in 1804 for a philosophical audience (in System 
der Philosophie als evidente Wissenschaft, or System of Philoso-
phy as Evident Sdence) and then in 1805 for a more popular 
audience (in Wissen, Glaube und Ahnung, or Knowledge, Fai-
th, and Presentiment). In 1805 he was invited to Heidelberg 
as professor of philosophy and mathematics. In Heidelberg, in 
1807, Fries published his three-volume masterwork, Neue Kri-
tik der V ernunf t (New Critique of Reason), which, as the title 
suggests, was intended to establish Kant's critical philosophy 
on a new basis. In the second edition of this work, published 
between 1828 and 1831, Fries amended the title to reflect the 
precise nature of this new basis. It· was, he indicated, a Neue 
oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft (New or Anthropolo-
gical [i. e., Empirical PsychologicalJ Critique of Reason). 
In the remaining years at Heidelberg Fries publish~d a num-
ber of works, including his System der Logik in 1811, a criti-
que of Schelling's philosophy of art in 1812, and several tracts 
on natural science in 1813. These latt~r tracts reflect an aspect of 
Fries's work which has gone unnoted up until now - Fries's 
inter~st in mathematics and the natural sciences. As early as 
his time in the Academy of the Moravians, Fries excelled in 
the study of both mathematics and the natural sciences, and he 
continued his study in these two areas at Jena. In fact, in 
1802 he published "Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Theo-
rien des Lichtes und der Warme" (Essay on a New Presenta-
tion of the Theories of Light and Heat), and in 1803 he publi-
shed a tract on Regulative fur die Therapeutik nach heuristi-
schen Grundslitzen der Naturphilosophie aufgestellt (Regula-
tions for Therapeutics Set Forth According to Heuristic Princi-
ples of Natural Philosophy). This tract on physiological thera-
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peutics is a ,largely forgotten work which merits attention f<;>r 
its very suggestive and innoyative ideas. For our purposes, hQ-
wever, its major signif!cance is that it was an early ·presenta-
tion of ideas ·which wer~ given different, and more systematic, 
eXP,ression in 1822,in Fries's important.Die mathematische Na-
turphilosophie (The Mathematical Philosophy of Nature). 
This mathematical philosophy, and Fries's defense.of mecha-
nical explanation i_n the natural _scieq.ces, put Fries into rather 
direct opposition to the Naturphilosophie of the idealis~s. Oppo-
sing the use of teleology as an explanatory principle in natural 
science, Fries went even further than Kant in philosoph~cally 
justifying the «Newtonian» approach to natural sci~nce. Unli-
ke Kant, who did not amend his evaluation of chemistry after 
Lavoisier's work, Fries included chemistry among the natural 
sciences proper, and he refused to admit the explanation of life 
according to teleological principles. (In fact, it was his espou-
sal of mechanical explanation in biology that led his disciple, 
Matthias Jakob ,Schleiden, to important new results and theo-
ries in the study of pl,ant ,life) 2 • But the major point to be 
made is that Fries was very well informed in the areas of 
natural science and was an innovator in the philosophy of scien-
ce 3• In fact, he was one of the very few philosophers whom 
German empirical scientists continued to respect aq.d read du-
ring the age of idealist philosophy 4• As we shall see, his con-
~ern about the sciences of «outer nature» - which was his 
only concern in Die mathematische Philosophie - was· accom-
panied by his interest elsewhere in the sciences of « inner natu-
2 Schleiden ( 1854), the founder of modern cytology, gave· credit to Fries for 
having originally suggested the idea of explaining organic processes by analogy 
with crystallization processes. 
3 Besides extending Kant's philosophy of natural science to include chemistry 
and biology, and adding morphological and phenomenological considerations to 
the theory of movement, Fries is credited with important innovations in the 
philosophy of mathematics. In fact, Nelson (1962; trans., 1970-71) has said 
that Fries «is the real founder of modern axiomatics; for he was the first 
not only to pose the problem of this science in general terms, but to work 
at it systematically» (Vol. 2, p. 167). 
4 E.g., Schleiden referred to Fries as the philosopher of natural science; 
Alexander von Humboldt approved of his natural scientific works; and Carl 
Friedrich Gauss, the great mathematician and astronomer, told a student that 
his time at the university would be well spent if the but learned to understand 
and value Fries's Die mathematische Naturphilosophie (Henke, 1867, p. 226). 
For a review of Fries's philosophy of the natural sciences, see Nobis (1972); 
regarding its impact on Schleiden, see Buchdahl ( 1973). 
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re-». 'Though he maintain~d·that the natural· scientific study of 
«:~?ter,,"ndture » wa~ .based.Ji>~~ ·diffe~ent .metaphysical (i. ~:, 
conceptual or- cat,egor1cal) prµic1ples than the ~c1ences of « m-
·ner riatqre », ne di& not assign to tlle sciertces of outer nature 
an epistemologically 'dif{erei'it 1itatmr. Both types of science; he 
said, were ~qua1ly valid << theoretica1 sciences » ins,ofar as they 
were both, founded fipoh a pridri principles. I shalf have more 
~to 1 say'""ab'out the principles· of ·psychology later in this article. 
Fries wrote l!>ie mathematische Naturphilosophie and va-
·rious .subsequent treati;;es op. mathematical and' natural scientific 
topics{(the. most impottant being Fries, 18Z6, 1839, and 1842' 
under gr~atly,changetl circumstances in tlle·post-Heidelberg years 
of liis. 'life: Tnese changed conditions stemmed from his return 
to. J'eha (as pfofessor Of theoretical philosophy) in 18t6 and 
Hi.s involvement there. and 'at the Wartburg Festival of 1817 in 
libetal, nat,ibpalistic political activities. In a series of private 
arid· J]tlblic ,ad'dresses he encouraged the· _political aetivism of 
student groups·. and W;as -Outspoken ill' his desire for constitutio-
nal' govetnm~nt: 'J'hese political convictions· anti behavior arou-
sed the opposition of authorities in both Berlin and Vienna, 
par.ticu1ably hfter a ·student who was loosely assdciated with Fries 
mtitdetea1 a suspe€ted government -spy in< 1819~ Fries had al-
ready been passed bver in'. ·1818 as a, candidate for the chair of 
pJ;lilosop]iy· in 'Berlin because of his political involvement; now 
'he lost his posit!<;m at Jet).a. Not until 1824 was Fries reinsta-
"te&· at Jena, anti 'then only as professor of mathematics and 
physics. AB:hough·'lie. was ·alloweel. to have a small number of 
private students in philosophy, he did not receive full Lehr-
freiheit (freedom in teaching) until 1838. That is, he was not 
allowed to, lecture. pub],i.py -on. philosQphy for almost twenty 
years - the· twenty years in which he 'Was at the height of 
powers avd in which the idealism he so totally oppose.cl. conque-
'red the German academi,a.. w,arld. in the guise of Hegelianism. 
It is very unlikely that Fries could have stemmed the tide of 
speculative- idealism even under the best of circumstances. But 
he might well hav.e become hetter known, and his philosophy 
might have received greater recognition as a viable alternative 
to· th~ reigning idealism, had he ·poi suffered political repres-
sion~ Indeed, if FJ:ies· had not· .been politically censured, he 
very possibly would have recef{T,ed: the appointment to the ·Ber-
lin· chair that went instead to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
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who was then not as well known as Fries 5 • Had the appoint-
ment gone to Fries the course of German philosophy might 
have been altered, slightly yet significantly. But as a matter of 
historical fact Fries did not receive the Berlin chair, and the 
fact that Fries was censured and lost his public audience at preci-
sely the same time that a philosophy very different from his 
own was rising to dominance was too great a liability to be 
offset. Even though he commanded great love and respect 
from the academic community at Jena throughout his exile 
and the rest of his life, and although a small group of dedica-
ted followers and natural scientists remained faithful to him, 
Fries was never able to fulfill the promise of fame and influen-
ce that was his at an earlier age. 
Nonetheless Fries was very productive in the years between 
1819 and his death in 1843. Besides works in mathematics 
and natural science, and numerous reviews and short works, 
Fries wrote treatises on the philosophy of politics, ethics, ae-
sthetics, religion, and the history of philosophy 6 • He also ex-
panded the «psychic anthropology» that was the foundation 
of his Neue Kritik der Vernunft into a book-length Handbuch 
der psychischen Anthropologie (Handbook of Psychic Anthropo-
logy, 1820-21) with which we shall be concerned in the sec-
tion on Fries's psychology. In 1824, he wrote his System der 
Metaphysik (System of Metaphysics) in which he gave systema-
tic expression to his distinctions between the metaphysics of 
outer and inner nature; knowledge, belief, and presentiment; 
and five different ways of viewing reality. And he took time 
to revise his System der Logik in 1819 and again in 1837, his 
5 Though younger by three years, Fries advanced much more quickly than 
Hegel through the German academic system. Both had begun their teaching 
careers in Jena in 1801, and both were made associate professors (ausserorden-
tlicher Professor) there in 1805. But Fries was a far more popular lecturer and 
also much quicker in developing and writing about his own unique philosophical 
dewpo'nt. By 1805 he had written three books and was offered the chair of 
philosophy and mathematics at Heidelberg. In 1807, when Hegel published his 
fir>t book, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, Fries published his masterwork, Neue 
Kritik der V ernunf t. When Hegel finally received the call to a professorship in 
1816, it was to the chair at Heidelberg that Fries had vacated in order to 
occupy the more prestigious chair at Jena. Only with Hegel's appointment 
o:t Berlin in 1818 did Hegel pass Fries in status and fame. See Kaufmann 
(1966, pp. 92, 96, 176). 
6 For a list of these and all of Fries's published writings, see [Fries's 
Bibliography] ( 1937). Vol. 26 of the Samtliche Schriften, when it appears, 
will contain a bibliography of writings by and about Fries. 
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Neue· Kritik der Vernunft in 1828-31, arid his Handbuch der 
psyc"hischen Anthropologie in 1837-39. , 
The total number. of Fries'.s writings, which will fill twenty-
six volumes in the completed modern edition of liis works, is a 
testament to the fact that Fries was 11 very hard-working and 
very well-round~d philosopher. His' interests were both theoreti-
·cal and pratical, scientific and religious, critical ana yet 'construc-
tive. Though he denied that man can know the absolute 'truth 
about reality, and thus criticized the idealists' belief that kno-
wledge can be systematized once and for all 7, he did assert 
that man can, and should, reach a level of theoretical and practi-
·cal knowledge which will help him understand and direct his 
life. Fries attempted to co.\}tribute to man's enlightenment in 
'vittually every area of theory and practice. In doing so, he felt 
compelled to oppose the· dominant philosophical tfends of his 
day. In the following section we will concentrate on the cen-
tral aspect of Fries's work that stands in particular oppositicin 
to: early n'ineteenth-century Gerinari idealism - his psychologi-
cal « completion » of Kant. 
FRIES'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S 
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
As m:uch as Fries opposed the idealistic « completion » of 
Kant,.he did not blame the idealists entirely for their tnetaphysi-
cal, or « transcendental», interpretation of the Kantian h_erita-
ge. ·The fault, Fries felt, was to a great extent Kant's own. For 
7 In oppos1t10n to the sti,eculative idealists, Fries felt that metaphysical 
principles (intuitional forms, categories of understanding, and ideas of reason) 
were regulative, not constittiHve. They cannot, he maintained, tell us about 
fhe actual nature of reality; and systematizing them, however useful, can 
never lead us beyond' the phenomenological limits of our knowledge to any 
final, absolute truth. Indeed, Fries claimed that there are different ways of 
«knowing», different points of view, or worldviews (Weltansichten); i.e., 
different «systems». of principles for understan~ reality. One can view 
reality as physical, either explaining it according to laws or describing and 
classifying it phenomenologically; or one can view reality from the viewpoint 
of inner mentality; or according to ethico-political norms; or finally according 
to religio-aesthetic ideals. Each approach is valid in itself, though the religio-
aesthetic view is the highest possible since it_ puts one in touch with the 
highest of values. But the religio-aesthetic view is not knowledge in the narrow 
sense. It provides a «presentiment» of absolute reality, not the certain 
knowledge that the idealists claimed to have reached. 
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as brilliant as Kant was, and as epoch-making as were his disco-
veries, he had,failed in the final analy~is to definitively establish 
the critical philosophy (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp. xv, 28-31; 
1820-21, Vol. 1, p. 100). That is, he had failed. to clarify and 
justify the exact nature of the critical method. Having discove-
red the various a priori intuitions, forms, and ideas which cha-
racterize the human mind, he had not adequately specified and 
validated the means by which he had made these important 
discoveries. Indeed, he had not even addressed himself to the 
issue, and he had unwittingly complicated the problem in the 
second edition of Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure 
Reason) by substituting a «transcendental» (or «objective») 
deduction of the categories of understanding in the place of 
the « subjective » deduction found in the first edition. In a 
very short time, the development of the implications of this 
transcendental deduction.led to speculative idealism, even though 
Kant himself (1781; 2d rev. ed., 1787; trans:, 1965) had 
vigorously denied that his approach constituted a transcenden-
tal idealism and insisted that the revision of the second edition 
represented no change in his thought (pp. 33-37 [BJ). Kanf 
had not realized that this revision had introduced what seemed 
to be a fundamental ambiguity into his doctrine. By doing so, 
it planted the seeds of future dissent between the idealists 
who followed the lead of the transcendental deduction and 
Fries who maintained that the original edition of the Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft, with its more subjective or psychological 
approach, was closer to the true critical method. 
The general problem involved in this issue was one that had 
engaged Fries's attention since the very beginning of his study 
of Kantian philosophy, namely, how did Kant come to his con-
clusions? Whereas Kant had sought a secure foundation upon 
which to establish philosophy, Fries went one step further, 
seeking to determine how such a foundation could b'e construc-
ted. That is, Fries set himself the task of submitting tl;te criti-
cal philosophy itself to a critical analysis in order to determine 
the exact nature of the critical method. Or, to express it in yet 
two more ways, Fries wanted to determine how the critical 
method provides knowledge and thus what kind of knowledge 
is provided by the critical method. The idealists implicitly main-
tained that the critical philosophy, by means of transcendental 
analysis, yields metaphysical knowledge about the nature of 
reality. Fries did not agree. 
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As mentioned in the' _hisrorical survey above~· Fries reached 
his own view of the critical philosophy as "early -a.s 1798 in 
"Ober das Verhiiltni's der empirischen P~ychologie zur Meta-
physik". In this arti:cl~ Fries first ·expressed' his convictiol! 
that; just as the critical philosophy is the foundation of meta-
physics proper, so in turn kempirjcal psychology the founda-
tion of the critical phil~sophy. At-bottom, Fries ·said, the criti-
cal meth,od provides lqlowledge by a ~egressive analysis which 
begin~ with the empirical facts of consciousness; thus, the. criti-
cal method leads to empirical, not' ·metaphy$ical, kno\Vledge. 
Tnbugh what comes to be known are the a priori forms of 
~hought', the knowledge of these ·forms is itself a posteriori. It 
is) the consequence' 6f an experienced chain of analysis. In 
short.,, ·Fries maintained that we coine to know the a priori 
forms 'in our th6ught only as a matter of' experience. Those 
for.{b.s :themse1ves are there all the time, but before our critical 
analysis we are not conscious of them, and they are not a 
m::l;tt~r of explicit knowledge. The critical philosophy, then, al-
though !it provides knowledge of the a priori and necessary 
elements in our understanding, is itself an empirical science 
based upon the analysis of cognitive states with which· we beco-
me familiar through self-observation. Thus, the critical philoso-
phy dep_ehd,s !JPOn psychology! 
~ T~is conclusion would have surprised Kant, of course, and 
Fries knew it. Despite the fact th~t Kant's earlier « subjecti-
~e ». deduction was more c;losely related to Fries's program of 
P.sY,cho~ogical analysis !ban was the la'ter « transcendental » de-
Cluetion; Fjies· did not. claim that K~nt had ever explicitly used 
a p·syc4ological method i.µ the 'first' edition of K.ritik der reinen 
Verntmf~. ·~ncfoed, he contended that K;ant f!ever properly defined 
oancl ;u~ilized 'the critical 'method (Fries~ 1807, Vol. 1, pp. xv, 
28-'31'; 182p-21, Vol. '.I., p. 100). Had he done so, Fries said, 
Kant cquld liave compl~t:ed the cr!tical philosophy himself. Sin-
ce he ·hap ndt 4one so, :Pries published his major work, Neue 
lf.ritik der Vernunft ( 1807)} in order to establish the critical 
phil9sophy upon a proper-methodological basis and thus to tom-
plete what Kan't hatl begun. 
:The· crucial defe~t in. Kant'~ ci;itique of reas~:m, acc9rding to 
·Fries, was that, although Kant's (1781; 2d rev. ed,, ,1787; 
trans. 1965) self-expressed goal had been to call reasoh « to 
undertake anew the most difficult of all its ta~k~, namely, tliat 
of self-knowledge» (p. 9 [A]), he had not understood that 
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this ·goal could be 'reached only through self-obs~rvation.' If 
one wishes to ~stablish the a priori"elements in ·knowledge, for 
example, one .tfiilst ·begin by first examining actual bits of kno-
wledge and then by a'Sking, as Kant did, what principles are 
necessary for the- very possibility of this knowledge ... One ·can-
not determine 'What is a priori in· knowledge· without first ha-
ving some idea. of what knowledge 'is. Thus,. one must"proceed 
according to a rigorous, two-step program, beginning with self-
observation (to learn about knowledge and the mental' prpces• 
ses that lead to it) and concluding with a regressive analysis 
(to abstract from ·actual instances of knowledge to the innate 
principles of knowledge) (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp. 40-41, 68). 
A discussion of both of these steps will summarize the essen-
tial nature of Fries's « new» critique of reason. 
The basis of Fries's critical method - its first step .-- was 
self-observation.. Through a careful phenomenology of the 
mihd Fries hoped not only to determine the various types of 
knowledge, but also to describe and classify the general types 
of mental processes which constitute mental life. He viewed 
the establishment of an adequate theory of the mind as a neces-
sary preliminary to a critical analysis of the innate forms of the 
mind (Fries, 1807, Vcrl. 1, p. 63). Indeed, he contended.that 
many of the difficulties in Kant's analysis had resulted from 
the fact that he had not be~n sufficiently critic-al ·at this"first 
stage 0£ his critical philosophy. Instead .of' validating his the_ory 
of mind through an empirical-investigation of mental ·phenome-
na, Kant had· simply assumed a· psychological theory;>which un-
critically utilized several distinctions that had been. 'passed 
down for centuries in logic an'.d psychology. The principal di-
stinctions to which :&'ries referred were those between ·under. 
standing and reason arrd between sensibility and intelligibility-. 
Through his own psychological observations, Fries became con: 
vinced that these distinctions were inadequate as understood 
by Kant and were responsible for serious problems in his « tran-
scendental» analysis of reason. 
The problem \W.th Kant's· distinction between reason and un-
derstanding, according to· Fries1 was that it kept' Kant from 
really investigating «,pure reason ». as. he had .intended. For 
when.he studied «-reason »,Kant studied only dialectical reason, 
the faculty of' making inferen~es about reality. But how, Frie'!> 
asked, does this dialectical reason differ £tom underst~nding, 
which is the faculty of judgment? Dialectical reason; he maintai-
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ned, is only a particular species of judgment; and so Fries 
preferred, on the basis of the observed similarity between the 
processes of judging and inferring, to include both under the 
rubric of understanding, which he defined as reflective or me-
diated reasoning 8• Such reasoning, he said, falls under the con-
trol of the will and is thus a matter of voluntary choice. Rea-
son, however, by which Fries meant pure reason, is not under 
the control of th~ will. It is an autonomous activity of kno-
wing. That is, it is spontaneous and involuntary. It is, in 
short, the source of the a priori and necessary elements in our 
knowledge 9• This is what a critique of reason should investiga-
te - not the dialectical illusions of reason, but the sponta-
neous activity of reason (i. e., the mind as purely active). 
Kant's failure to adequately distinguish between unders.tan-
ding and pure reason was directly related, according to Fries, 
to his acceptance of the sensibility-intelligibility distinction. This 
traditional distinction, Kant said, made the analysis of sponta-
neously active reason virtually impossible. For if the innate 
forms cannot come from sensibility (and they cannot if they 
are truly innate), then Kant could only assert that they were 
an innate part of reflective intelligibility. But reflective intelligi-
bility is a faculty of mediate and voluntary, not immediate and 
a priori, knowledge. Thus Kant's disjunctive distinction bet-
ween sensibility and intellegibility prevented him from posi-
ting a truly innate and non-mediated source of cognition. 
To solve this dilemma, Fries proposed one of his major inno-
vations. He introduced a third source of knowledge, distinct 
from both sensibility and intelligibility. A priori forms of kno-
wledge, he said, if they ;:tre truly a priori, can proceed neither 
from immediate sensation nor from mediated reflections. They 
must be immediate .(though not sensations) and cognitive (thou-
gh not mediated). That is, the innate forms of the mind must 
constitute a third source of knowledge - immediate cogni-
8 Regarding Fries's distinction and definition of (pure) reason and under-
standing, see Fries (1807, Vol. 1, pp. 302-321; 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 24-27, 
37-41, 50-52). 
9 Fries referred to the pure-reason aspect of knowledge as « self-ilctivity » 
(Selbstthiitigkeit). For his basic distinction of the pure (active) and the 
receptive (sensual) foundations of knowledge, see Fries (1807, Vol. 1, pp. 78-
84); for a discussion of Fries's distinction of (pure) reason and understanding 
(i.e., the reflective processes of thought, from which Fries had distinguished 
reason), see Fries (1807, Vol. 1, pp. 238-257). 
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tlon 10 • 
By making this new distinction Fries was able to solve a 
number of the problems· he· saw in Kant's analysis when he 
moved on to the second stage of his critical method, the regres-
sive analysis, or deduction, of 'the a priori elements in knowled-
ge. Because he had shifted the· consideration of innate forms 
from the level of reflective thought to a cognitive level prior 
to reflection (i. e., to immediate cognition, or knowledge), 
Fries not only avoided the confusion .of voluntary with involun-
tary mental eleµients, but more importantly he showed the 
need for a new type of regressive analysis and a purely subjecti-
ve process of validation. Whereas Kant in dealing with media-
ted, or reflected, intelligibility (or understanding) could speak 
of deductive proofs of a priori forms, Fries pointed out that 
such « proof » is impossible -in dealing with cognitive elements 
which are truly immediate rather than mediate. One cannot 
«prove» an a priori form by referring it to something prior; 
one can only discover and describe it. That is, in the process of 
regressive analysis from actual knowledge to the innate princi-
ples of knowledge, one can only point out what principles do 
in fact' emerge at the end of the analysis. One can never justify 
or prove these principles since they are immediate and indepen-
dent of any other type of knowledge (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp. 
3, 39-41, 296-314,. 381-390; Vol. 2, ipp. 186-213). 
By thus arguing that immediate, or a priori, cognitions can 
be affirmed by a regressive analysis, but never proven in the 
same sense that one can prove mediated knowledge by referen-
ce to its logical relation to given premises, Fries prepared the 
way for a new « subjective » rather than· « trascendental » vali-
dation of knowledge. According to Fries, knowledge that can 
be shown to be based upon immediate cognition is ipso facto 
1o The references in the previous note are relevant to Fries's tripartite di-
stinction of immediate cognition (or spontaneously active, pure reason), sen-
sibility (receptivity), and intelligibility (understanding). Also see Fries (1807, 
Vol. 2); the entire volume is devoted to the discussion and analysis of im-
mediate cognition ( unmittelbaren Erkenntniss); see especially pp. 3-101. As 
Nelson ( 1962; trans., 1970-71) has pointed out, Fries's doctrine of immediate 
cognition depends upon his distinction between that which is simply imme-
diate (but «obscure») in our knowledge and that which is simply immediate 
(i.e., clear and distinct) to our consciousness. The 'immediate cognition of 
which Fries spoke was immediate in the first sense. Though present in 
knowledge as its regulative principles, immediate cognitions must be disco-
vered by a process of analysis (Vol. 2, pp. 177, 203, 216). Nelson claimed 
that Fries was the first philosopher since Plato to exploit this insight. 
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true, not because we can prove it but because we hav~ no 
.choice· but to .rely upo;rr 'it. Stat~,d. $fferently, Fries ,claimed 
that human knowletlge"'is subjectively valid j.nsofar -as it relies 
upon· the innate forms- .of t'h¢ II\ind. l'his « self-reliance .of. re~­
~on » (Selbstvertrauen der VetJ'!unft) - t}le fa,ct tpat. reason 
automatically forms knowledge .in certain ways - is its best 
and, only possible validation, By ~n- innate « fee]J.ng-for-truth » 
human beings grasp the J;?henolhen0logical rea~ity of the world 
(Fries,. 1807 t Vol. 1, pp. ~vii-xviii, 57-60; Vol. 2, pp. 
)'86-213; 1824a,·p. 20). 
With this line of argumentation Fries established the basis 
of .his philosophy. The foundation ·of the ,certainty of knowled-
ge, he.,said; was reas,on's immediate and imp4cit faith in, itself. 
One need m>t attempt a circulaP pro@f of knowledge in terms 
0£ the'·p@ssibility of experience;. a psychological analysis of ac-
·tual. ~owiedge, co,i\lbined· with- a. r~gressive analysis which tra-
ce,s .this- kno;wledge to its· ultimat~ reliance upon immediate 
forms of cognition, will rev~al th(! ~asis· of knowledge. 
Wjth Fries!& approach thus 'briefly summarizedi the natural 
question is: how .did the 'C~tegories of und~rstanding which he 
derived. by means of this ptocedure 'differ from those whieh 
.Kant; derived? The answer: J;fot _at; all. F~ies perfectly agreed 
witfo tP,e· conclusion of Kant;s own deduction; he simply did 
not think that Kant correctly understo@d the psychological ba-
·$is of his own. ,philosophy, and that Kant mistakenly tried to 
Pl;ove what can- only be· described. 
. 'thqs, .the .cqief sigµificance of Fri~s, vis-a-vis the Kantian 
,heritage,, is not•tha~ pe cqang~cj.~1).t'S·COnclusi:ons, but that he 
tried. tb reforme the nature. of Kant's methG>d .. In so doing, he 
radically <§hifred .tq~ c~cep.tto~ pf-.~ .~tatus ¢ psychology and 
its 're~ation to. philosop,hy.: Whereas Kant had tontended that 
psychology was only an empirical sciehce (by which he meant 
that it was no true science at all) and that the proper method 
of empirical psy~hology was observation of external behavior 
and· not introspection (Leary, 1978); and whereas the idealists 
·felt that psychology was 'at best a limited i(l,Ild one-sided investi-
;gatiop. ·of mental processes (Leary, 1980b); Fries, in investiga-
'ting the foundation of the critical method itself, concluded that 
!he critical philosophy (and thus all philosophy) was based 
upon the introspective science of .psychology! Agreeing with 
Kant that psychology was an enipfrical science, Fries argued 
that psych.Glogy could nonetheless be a true science, possessing 
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its own 'unique metapliysical basis. :f'arthermore:, he s~id- that 
psychology was the scienze of inner experience,and that therefo.: 
re its, P.roper methpd, Kant notwiths~anc!ing, w~s introspection. 
And since all ·knowledge is, a matter .of inner experience, Fries 
maintained that psycholbgy is- iundamental to any other- scien-
ce, incfuding the criticaI philoso2liy. O~ly through a .psychologi-
cal investigation can the actual· processes antl a priori bases of 
knowledge be identified. 
Thus did Fries revise the conception of psychology. Psyclio-
logy was no -longer, as with Kapt, -seen. ·as «merely .eqipid-
.cal »; nor, as with the·~idealists, was- it s~en .as in- need .of 
&upplementation by other more complete sci~nces. It w~s a 
true and, autonom01.:is scjens:e .which itself supported ,all the 
·other ·sci:ences.. lq the ·pqst-Kantian dev~lop!llent from anti-
psychologism Jd the em~rgence of a scientific psyc;hology, this 
contention of Fri'es was ill/pprtant ·and. ·significant! We sl;all 
investigate Fries's psychology in- the next section. 
FRIES'S PSYCHOLOGY 
Tn his earliest· writings, Fries- generally referred to the scien-
ce of psychology as« empirical psychology» (e.g., F1ies, ·1798a, 
b). However, by 1807, in Neue."Kritik dl!r Vernunft, he prefer-
red to call his own psychology «"philosophical arlthropology .. >~, 
and in 1820, under the influence 0£. G. E. Schulze, he changed 
the title of his psychology to « psychic anthropology » 11 • In 
the second edition of Neue Kritik der Vernunft (1828-31:), in 
which he again used the .title of «psychic anthropology», 
Fries explained why he had avoided the use qf the term 
« psychology »: 
Although this science is usually called psychology 1 w.e will deviate froin 
this terminology· for several reasons. The word «psyche» (or soul) has 
,been used in philosophy to designat~ the metaphysical, persisting, simple, 
and immortal essence.bf .the spirit, and its use therefore''impj.ies certain 
assumptions which we cannot' now entertain. We are only concerned- with 
developing a dpctrin~ hf the nature of the human soul based upon "inner 
11· Fries (182<Y-21; Vol. !; p . .5): freely, admitted that-:Schulze (1Sl5) haQ. 
influenced his choice oft the term '<<psychic \lnthropology », but it.should •be 
stressed· that Fries 'appropria.ted only the title from· Schulze; ili.e- substance of 
Fries's own psychic anthropology was developed long• hefore Schulte's work. 
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experiehce. Thus we will deal only with inner anthropology. In thus nar-
rowing our scope to the hqman spirit, we arrive at ·the topic of empirical 
psychology, or psychic anthropology. But our present task differs from 
empirical psychology, which is ah experimental physics of inner life (eine 
innere Experimentalphysik) which remains forever fragmentary. We will 
not be satisfied with such a science. We want to achieve a [unifiedJ 
theory of inner life, a doctrine of .inner nature, which will provide for 
[the study of] our inner psychic nature what 'the philosophy of nature 
now provides for physics. This part of psychic anthropology we want to 
calJ philosophical anthropology (Vol. 1, p. 36). 
Thus, Fries called his psychology 12 «psychic anthropo-
logy » both to avoid the metaphysical assumptions of the old 
rational psychology and to indicate his dissatisfactioh with the 
current « fragmentary » and mechanical empirical psychology 13 • 
On the first account, in rejecting the old metaphysics of the 
soul, Fries accepted Kant's critique of rational psychology; on 
the second, in rejecting the metely empirical status of psycho-
logy, he disagreed with Kant's evaluation of the limited episte-
mological possibilities of psychology. Instead he maintained that 
psychology need not be « merely empirical », that it can attain 
the true status of a science, and, in other words, that its pheno-
mena can be rationally organized according to metaphysical cri-
tefia. Kant (1786; trans., 1970) had denied this possibility, 
claiming that the metaphysical principles of natural science we-
re not applicable to psychology (p. 8). Fries agreed that the 
principles which Kant referred to as .<<the metaphysical princi-
ples of natural science» could not be used in psychology, but 
12 Though Fries preferred to call his psychology « psychic anthropology», 
it is perfectly justifiable to refer to his «psychic anthropology» as psychology. 
He avoided the term « psychology » for the reasons given above, but he 
himself ( 1820-21) said that psychic anthropology could be « simply called 
psychology» (Vol. 1, p. 2). For that reason, the term «psychology» was used 
throughout the previous section without qualifications. 
13 Fries's opposition to « fragmentary» empirical psychology illustrates his 
general opposition to a narrow-minded empiricism that advocated the collection 
of facts without any .consideration of their relation to an adequate theory of 
mind. Although strict empiricists claimed to be free of all need for such 
theories, Fries pointed out that they nonetheless unwittingly assumed a theory 
of mechanical association (the « inner physics » to which he referred in the 
quotation above). Such a mechanical theory was based upon an analogy bet-
ween inner and outer nature which might or might not be appropriate, but . 
in either case it was not yet justified by the development of a critical theory 
of the mind. When Fries developed such a theory, he found that the psy-
chology of association did not ·provide a complete explanation of mental phe-
nomena. Most importantly, as we shall see, it failed to account for the a 
priori idea of association upon which associationist psychology is based. 
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he pointed out that these principles were really « metaphysical 
principles of outer nature », not natural science per se, and 
that another set of metaphysical criteria was possible. These 
alternate principles, constituting an autonomous « metaphysics 
of inner nature», would make possible the development of a 
truly scientific psychology 14 • By means of such criteria, or 
« the metaphysical doctrine of our scientific knowledge of the 
mind» (which is what Fries called the metaphysics of inner 
nature in his System der Metaphysik, 1824b, p. 392), psycho-
logy could be more than a merely « fragmentary » collection of 
data organized in a post hoc fashion according to the mechani-
cal analogy of association; it could unify and explain these 
empirical phenomena according to the rational laws proper to 
the mind itself. Thus, psychology could be a true science 15 • 
Fries not only felt that such a scientific psychology was possi-
ble; he offered his own « psychic anthropology » as the realiza-
tion of that possibility 16 • Through a two-step_ procedure he 
both gathered data and discovered the criteria by which these 
data could be rationally ordered and understood. The first task 
was accomplished by psychic anthropology proper, which consi-
sted of a natural description of the various phenomena of the 
human mind as they presented themselves in experience. The 
14 As Fries ( 1820-21) put it, «we can not hope to achieve a correct treatment 
of psychic anthropology without metaphysics. All empirical knowledge, including 
empirical knowledge of inner phenomena, has philosophical forms at its 
foundation. There is a metaphysics of inner nature which allows us to 
determine the fundamental concepts of inner activity, its degrees, the faculties 
of the mind, etc. Its principles can not be avoided in the description of inner 
nature, even if one tries to disregard them. But in this case they will guide 
description in a faulty way» (Vol. 1, p. 10). Fries distinguished the metaphy-
sics of «inner» and «outer» nature most explicitly in System der Philoso-
phie ( 1804, pp. 286-324) and System der Metaphysik ( 1824b, pp 354-429). 
The distinctions made explicit in these works guided the development of his 
psychic anthropology. 
15 Even in going beyond Kant by maintaining that psychology, or «psychic 
anthropology », could be ordered according to its own autonomous principles, 
Fries remained faithful to Kant's definition of a true science as a body of 
knowledge which is organized according to rational principles. This does not 
mean that Fries denied that psychology was an empirical science. Just like 
physics, psychology was to deal with empirical phenomena in a scientific ( ra-
tional) way, using a critically validated conceptual framework. 
16 Fries's « psychic anthropology» was the culmination of the psychological 
ideas that he began to develop in his 1798 articles and that found their fullest 
expression in his Handbuch ( 1820-21). Other important formulations of 
various psychological theses can be found in Fries (1803b, 1807, 1811, and 
1824b). 
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second task of providing a theory of mind .that could explain 
these phenomena, by means of general laws was fulfilled. by the 
deve1opme·nt of, a « philosophical ·anthropology » through a criti-
cal ·analysis of the descriptions of mental phenomena. The di-
stinction betW.een.. the different procedures of psychic and philo-
sophical anthropology was not as definite in practice as in 
theory, however, as Fries himself admitted. The two tasks of 
describing and explaining are not completely· separable. 0ne 
carlnot explain something without having some idea (descrip-
tionl·of what is to be explained. And conversely, a pure descrip-
tion'.is impossible, as Fries (1820-21) pointed out, because the 
understantling automatically begins to generalize about pheno-
mena in certain ·ways even as it attempts to describe them 
(Vol. 1, p. 3). But this seeming confusion, this interconnection 
of description and- explanation, is precisely what makes philoso-
phical anthropology possible. By analyzing the principles impli-
cit in the natural descriptions of mental phenomena one can 
discover ·the metaphysical prindples of inner nature. Once disco-
vered through introspection and analysis, these principles can 
be used - and were used by Fries - to rationally organize 
the observed phenomena pf the mind. 
The first principle of Fries's « metaphysics of inner nature» 
resulted from his most basic observation: all inner phenomena 
must be conceptualized as activities 17• Beyond that, all these 
inner activities are expetienc\:!d as unified. Taking his cue from 
Kant, Fries attributed this unifi'.ea nature of mental phenomena 
to the existence of an "I", but he· also agreed with· Kant in 
denying ·tlie,r possibility of' any )<nowlegge of the. ontologica~ 
nature of this experie~ced, '!I"! Thereby he rejected the possibi-
lity of h'tional ·psychology -arid its goal of absolute knowledge 
.of the ~qul. Instead, .. fr4:s corn;lyQ.ed, only a « natural doctrine 
of the mind » built 'upon « regulative » or «.heuristic » principles 
is possible, and these principles must be derived from the de-
scription and analxsis of the activities of the empirical "I" or 
mind (GemiJth) .. . ; 
Obs~rv'.ation· of these mental activities leads naturally, Fries 
maintained, to the analytical classification of them into several 
fundamental categories, or «faculties» (Gemuthsvermogen). 
17 The following discussion of the «JD.etaphysics of inner nature». is based 
on Fries (1804, pp. 340-348; 1807, Vol. 1, pp. 65~106; 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 
1-89; 1824a, pp. 64-69). · 
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These· faculties, he- stressed, do not designate really separable 
processes 18 • If they did1 the basic principle of. the urtity of .. the 
mind would be violated. Rathel', 1his classification of activities 
is only a means of expressing. the regularities· in menta1 acti-
vity. Nonetheless such a classificatiort is an ·important task sin-
te the phenomena of hiner life cannbt be understood unless 
they are ordered systematically- according to a rationally com-
prehensible scheme 19 • And this scheme, even if onl9' « regulati-
ve», is hot at all arbitra.ry since it must be reached and confir-
med by the analysis of the facts of consciousness. Indeed, Kan-
t's tripartite classification, Fries claimed, and· all prior divisions 
of the « faculties » of the mind, were inadequate. Contrary to 
Kant's distinction of thinking, feeling, and tlesire, a thorough 
analysis of introspective descriptions revealed to Fries ·that the 
fundamental categories of .mental activities are knowlecfge (Er: 
kenntniss), inner disposition (most often referred to as ·Gemuth 
or Herz), and activity (Thzztkraft). In other words, Frres main-
tained that Kant's distinc;tion of feeling and desire does ·not 
withstand critical scrutiny. Both, he said, are always conflated 
in inner disposition 20 • But he found reason to maintain the 
number of mental faculties at three when he discovered that 
the phenomena of willing, or self-control, are conceptually di. 
stinct from the phenomena of knowing and having a (positive 
or negative) disposition toward a thing. One can choose td act 
contrary· to either knowledge or disposition, and so « activity» 
is conceptually distinguishable frQm the-se other -faculties, ~r 
capacities, of the "I" 21 , . 
These three faculties, then, were the result of· Fries"s- analy-
sis of various mental phenomena. However, the·use of the prin-
ciple of mental faculties alone was not sufficient, according to 
Fries, for an understanding of these phenomena. Anotlier set 
18 In fact, in: the actual course of mental life, Fries said, all three fa1,:ulti~s 
are more or less involved in every activity. 
19 Fries was aware of the arguments ·against faculty psychology, but he 
answered that some kind of conceptual classification of mental activities is 
necessary. 
2o This is the old Wolffian approach to feeling and desire. 
21 Although Fries ( 1820-21) called for a clarification of psychological: vo-
cabulary as a prolegomenon to any advancement in psychology (Vol. 1, pp. 
12-13), several of his distinctions are liable to cause confusion. Thou~h all 
the faculties are « activities », he called the 'third faculty « activity 1$ in a 
narrower sense. Similarly, Fries used- the word Gemuth sometimes to mean 
mind in general and sometimes to refer to the faculty of inner disposition. 
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of principles was needed to ~ccount, for· the observed develop-
ment of these mental· capacities over time. A child does not 
think like an adult; nor does a child have the dispositions or 
the will-power of an. adult. To account for these observations, 
Fries proposed anather set of « heuristic» principles, a genetic 
scheme of developmental stages. Each faculty, Fries said, goes 
through three stages. of development in which its activity is 
governed first by sensation, then by habit, and finally by under-
standing. That is, the faculties are first stimulated into activity 
by a sensual stimulus (sinnliche Anregung, or Reiz) 22 • Then, in 
the course of ongoing experience, habitual modes of activity are 
developed according to« the laws of memory, custom, and asso-
ciation-»; i. e., according to the lower mental processes. Fi-
nally, the human mind comes to rule itself by means of under-
standing and the laws of the higher mental processes 23 • By 
combining the structural categories of the faculties with this 
genetic schema of stages, Fries arrived at a very complex and 
dynamic conception of mental activity. 
This brief summary of Fries's «metaphysics of inner nature» 
points out the most important principles upon which Fries 
built his «psychic anthropology» - the principles of psychic 
activity, unity, faculties, and stages. Of these, only the schema 
of stages was in itself radically new 24 • And of the stages that 
he posited, the third was the most innovative, involving as it 
did the distinction between understanding tnd thinking and an 
entirely new approach to understanding. Understanding, accor-
ding to Fries, was not so much a particular faculty as it was 
the highest developmental stage of each faculty. More specifi-
cally, it was « the power of self-control'» (Selbstbeherrschung) 
through which a man becomes capable of developing himself. 
This power of self-control, according to Fries (1820-21), was 
22 Among the primary principles of Fries's «metaphysics of inner nature » 
is this proposition that reason, although it acts in a self-determined manner, 
needs to be stimulated into activity. This dual character of reason is expressed 
as its «receptivity» (openness to stimuli) and «spontaneity» (autonomous 
behavior, once stimulated). See Fries (1807, Vol. l, pp. 139-148). 
23 Fries's concept of the mental stages developed more over time than his 
other basic ideas. It is notably missing or in only seminal form in the earlier 
works. For the best treatment, see Fries ( 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 62-89, especi~ 
pp. 62-63). 
24 As noted below, others were taking a « historical » view of « the soul » 
in Fries's time, and he might have been influenced by. such individuals. Ho-
wever, Fries's own schema of stages was original. 
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the·fundamental idea (Grandgedanke) of his psychic. anthropo· 
logy (Vol. 1, pp .. v-vi, 16) 25 • A perusal of the structure of his 
Handbuch der psychische Anthropologie confirms his asser-
tion. After'the first part of this work, in which Fties reviewed 
the variety of·psychic phenomena and analyzed these phenome-
na into faculties and st~ges, the next three parts are concerned 
wit4 a detailed discussion of the development of each faculty 
to its fullest extent ·- i. e., to the point where t4e mind 
controls itself through understanding the goals of each of its 
faculties. The faculty of knowing, for instance, being the « spe-
culative area qf human life», reaches its fullest potential when 
it is «under the control of kt}owledge or .[in other words] 
under the idea of truth». The second, or «contemplative», 
faculty develops toward « the control of inner disposition or 
the idea of beauty »; and the third, « pratical » faculty is most 
fully actuated «under the control of the will or [in other 
words] under the idea of the good » 26 • Thus. at the point of 
mature development the mental activities of thinking, being, di-
sposed, and willing are carried out under the guidance of a 
proper understanding of .the « regulative » ideas which provide 
the « heuristic » ends towards which these various aetivities 
should be consciously directed. 
This completes our brief sketch of the basic principles and 
propositions of Fries's « psychic anthropology ». It does not, of 
course, provide an outline of all of his psychological doctrines. 
For instance, nothing·has been said about his doctrine of sensa-
tion or his theory of association, although 'Fries had new and 
important things to say regarding both of these lopics 
(Hoffding, 1894-95; trans., 1955, Vol. 2, p. 244). Nor have 
we reviewed his genetic theory of experience (Erdmann, 1866; 
3d rev. ed., 1878; trans., 1890, Vol. 2, p. 456) or his innovati-
ve dis.cussions of psychopathology 27 • But we have discussed 
the fundamental points of his psychology, enough to facilitate 
the consideration of Fries's development of the conception of 
the nature and methods of psychology in the next and final 
section of this article. 
25 Regarding «understanding» (Verstand), see Fries (1807, Vol. 1, pp. 
302-321; 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 50-62). 
26 See table of contents, Fries ( 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. xi-xii). 
27 The major source regarding Fries's ideas about psychopathology is Fries 
(1820-21, Vol. 2). It is interesting to compare the mature ideas in this work 
with the seminal ideas about physiopathology in Fries ( 1803b). 
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-CONCr.USrON:. FRIES ANp ~THE .CONCEPT.Ut..L 
DEV...EL0PMENT OF .P
0
SYCHOLOGY 
F.r.ies agr~~d with !\ant that psycP,oiogy was an empirical 
scienae, :but }le did n0t think th11t psychologic;_al ~cience was 
<< mer(]ty empirical i> •• Even- the most.« fr~gmentary » type of 
empwiq1l· psycholp,.gy - i. e.,.associati0riist ~sychology, the « ex-
p~liroeptal .physics of inner life » tQ.at Fries (l~Q7) criticized 
(V.ol. 1, p. 36) - w_as }}.Ot totally empirical. Af.ter an; its obser-
vations were guided and unified ·by tbe idea of association, an 
i<l~a which, Fries pointed out, could not itself be the product 
of association 28-; Thus, even, this most elemental approach to 
empirical psychology was based upon a rational principle that 
wasinot a product of experience. And beyond association, addi-
tional ..rational principles could be 'discovered for psychology, 
Erie~, iQ.sisted) by m~ap.s ~f ~ regressive analysi& applied to the 
dat~ "df.e~erie.nce. In ffict, as we J1ave seen, he him§elf offered 
a. complete doctrine of inner nature, a. unified set of rational 
p,rinciples that would provide for p.sych0logy what the doctrine 
of outer nature had already provided for:. physics - an a prio-
ri, r~ti.onal basis. Upon this rational basis, Fries said, a ~ruly 
scientific psychology could be develeped. 
,Fries's itllportant innovation, then, was to assert that« inner » 
experience is guided by « metaphysical » principles as cer-
taialy; and.as knowably, as «outer» experience. Kal].t had not 
invented the distinction between the inp.er and outer spheres 
of experien~e, but hi$ philosophy greatly reinforced tPi~ basic 
duali&m. l}s a iesult of his works the problematic split bet~ 
ween m1lh and natu,re, or freedom and_ determinism, became 
p'3tt of the standard -intellectuttl heritage -0f the nineteenth cen-
tory. Accordj.ng to Kant, only external phenomena can be known 
according to rational crit~ria; i. e., only external phenomena 
cap be the oqjects -0f t.rue science. Fries acceptd t;he dualism -0f 
man and nature, the inner ai;:id the outer, but he maintaihed 
that inner phenomena are equally .subject to rational principles, 
albeit their own unique set of rational principles. Thus, Fries 
created a dualism of« metaphysics » (i. e., epistemology) by pro-
28 Regarding association, see Fries (1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 33-37); also, Nelson 
( 1962; trans, 1970-71, Vol. 2, pp. 200-202). Fries did not oppose associatio-
nist .psychology per se, but only its cruder form in whiCh no distinctions were 
made between the lo\1/er and higher (will-controlled) thought processes. 
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viding « grounds for knoWledge ·>$ 'tll.36Ui· man's inner life that. 
were .different, from t\le principles which guide our natur~ kno-
wledge .of :the ~~ternar world. in this. w~y 1i'ries begaµ the 
quest,,for the epistemologicaLfo4ngation.of the h,uman sci<;:nc~s 
which was continued by Dilthey; Windelband, Rickert and 
others later in the century 29 • 
Thus Fries defended .a·dualiSm of the« inner» and« outer» 
sciences. Both types -of science have their own rational ,basis, 
he said, at).d both have a unique conceptual ·structure .. ~oth '.ire 
valid theoretical sciences. However, Fries. diet not: .feel that >the 
«.metaphysics of inner nature '>»was in every· .respect parallel to 
tbe « metapnysics of. l'>uter nature>~, and 1he· clifferenceJ.s ~nifi­
cant: For "!llthougll there ate prificiples for understanding inner 
phehomena ·just as there· are principles for understandin~ outer 
phenome:na, there is: nothing in psychological science, as far as 
Fries could tell, that can replace tho~e partkular ,rational·princi-
ples by which' the forms of sensibi~iiy are made ibt~lligl.ble .1n 
the physic'al sciences. Tha~ is, there is nothing to replace mathe-
matics. This, we shoiald •recall (Leary; 1978), was a major 
point in Kant's critique 6£ psychology. Inner phenomena, ha-
ving no,spatial dimensions or relations, are only temporally se_, 
quential. Thus, Kant concluded, they cannot be subjecte3 to 
mathematical, i. e., to ideal rational treatment. 'Freis agreed wi-
th Kant> that any complete explanatfon of natunal phenomena 
must utilize mathemati'cs and-that insofar as psychology is·una-· 
ble to 1express its obs.ervations frt a mathem:atical furm its ~pla­
natory power is limited'. Thus he concluded 'that psJchoiogy, 
can never offer as complete an 'explanatibti bf 'its phenomepa 
as can phy_sics. However, this does not -mean that. psycholqgy 
has no explanatory power at all. Fries's 1hought on< this point 
was expressed succinctly by his twentieth-century disciple, -Leo-
29 Fries also developed the concepts ol worlpvkw ( W eltansicht) and value. 
Whether or not Fries's frn::mulations of these .concepts were a direct influence 
upon Dilthey, Windelbllnd, etc., who utilized relat'ed concepts, has not been 
established. It should also be noted that Fries's assertion that' inner life ·is 
subject to rational principles is not a defense of the possibility of a rational 
psychology, as traditionally defined. F,ries was as emphatic as Kant in rejecting 
the possibility of knowing the noumenal nature of the spul or "I". Wh,en 
Fries claimeq th!\t psychology could be hased 'upon rational· principles' he .was 
referring to «regulative», not «constitutive», principles. Just as' the principles 
of outer nature, i:is presented in Kant's and 'Fries's natural philosophie~, were 
purely regulative gui9es to scientific thi!lking, so too were .Frjes's principles 
of inner nature. · • 
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nard Nelson (19621 trans., .197.0-71): 
Psychic phenomena ,cannot be measured, so theoretical explanation of 
them is possible only i!.l a limited degr~e. But that is not to say that they 
cannot be theoretically eiplaihed at all, for they can, within the limits set 
by the impos~ibility of measurement (Vol. 2, pp. 258-259)., 
In other words, Fries argued. that psychology can still offer 
theoretical explanations even though these necessarily lack the 
apodictic force of. mathematical formulations. The rational prin-
ciples of inner experience, though in a sense more descriptive 
than explanatory, do provide a framework. within which to un-
derstand psychplogical dynamics. As pointed out early in this 
article, Fries denied any hard and fast distinction between de-
scription and explanation. Certainly, his developmental stages, 
fpr instance, help to explain at the same time that they categori-
ze mental phenomena. But such conceptual explanation falls 
short, Fries admitted, of the ideal set by the physical sciences. 
What Fries contended, then, was this: even if psychology 
cannot utilize mathematics, it can still be a legitimate theoreti-
cal science, although not a totally precise one. This is the 
major contention as far as Fries is concerned. It epitomizes his 
development of the notion of psychology as a science. Contrary 
to Kant he felt that psychology, using empirical and introspecti-
ve techniques combined with subsequent« regressive analyses», 
can be a true science even without mathematics. 
Having said this, we can add that Fries was not as totally 
pessimistic as we have implied regarding the applicability of 
mathematics to psyc;J:iology. Though Fries certainly did reel 
that the use of aQ.y precise and ·sophisticated mathematical-..mea-
surement of mentaL phenomena is impossible, he also felt, in 
the words of Leonard Nelson (1962; trans., 1970-71) again, 
that 
Comparison of size can be made in this field [i.e., psychology] in terms 
of degrees by the metaphysical law of Quality that every sensibly perceived 
quality has an intensive magnitude which can increase or decrease conti-
nuously (Vol. 2, p. 259). 
Fries referred to this law as the law of continuity (Stetig-
keit), and he said that it was the only mathematical law which 
is applicable to psychology (Fries, 1804, pp. 343-344; 1824a, 
pp. 66-67). Since he himself never actually applied this law to 
express a psychological function in.mathematical terms, we must 
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be cautious not to overevaluate' his qualification of Kant's gene-
ral exclusion ef mathematics from psychology - aJl the more 
so since Kant himself expressed a similar qualifi~ation. Nonet~e­
less Fries's step away from Kant's « official» position becomes 
significant in view of the later developments in psychology 1ctt 
the hands of Johann Friedrich Herbart (Leary, 1980a). 
With this discussion of the possibility of mathematics in 
psychology our comparison of Fries's psychology with Kant's is 
completed. It should now be instructive to turn for a moment 
to a comparison of Fries's psychology with that of the idea-
lists, for although Fries's psychology was primarily developed 
from Kantian foundations, it was also developed in the context 
of opposition to idealism. Despite this opposition, there are a. 
number of similarities between the idealist approach to psycholo-
gy and Fries's psychology. This should not be surprising given the 
common background of both German idealism and Friesian phi-
losophy: Besides the common grounding in Kantian philosophy, 
~oth approaches are historically related to R~inhold's « elemen-
tary philosophy » with its emphasis upon « consciousness », and 
both approaches develop this theme as a central aspect of their 
psychol~gy. As a consequence, both approaches also stress the 
role of introspection. Beyond this, there is in both approaches 
a common emphasis upon the activity of consciousness. In this 
regard Fichte, Fries's erstwhile teacher, was probably an influen-
ce upon Fries. Fries seems also to have been influenced by 
Fichte's stress on the will and his moralistic concerns about 
the individual's relation to society 30 • And finally, there is a 
striking resemblance between the idealist tendency to take a 
genetic, «history of consciousness » approach ·and Fries's con-
cept of mental stages and his concern with the genetic develop-
ment of mental capacities and incapacities 31 • It is possible, 
though not necessarily the case, that Fries was influenced in 
this regard by his reading of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von 
Schelling's works (e. g., Schelling, 1803). . 
Against this background of agreement we could place as 
many or more points of disagreement. Idealists generally oppo-
30 The stress upon will is seen in Fries's view that the highest development 
of each mental faculty consists in its subordination to the will, or self-control, 
of the "I". Fries's concern with the relation of the individual to society is 
ap~arent in his works on ethics and politics (e.g., Fries, 181848). 
1 Regarding the development of individual· differences in mental abilities 
and the development of mental illness, see Fries (1820-21, Vol. 2). 
241 
sedJaculty psychology, for instance,.while_Fries stp.unchlY, defen-
ded it .. And Schelling's philqsophy of identity·rinspired many 
idealist psychologists to speculate, on the relations between the 
mind and the body (Leary, 1980b), whereas Frj.es (1820-21) 
opposed such speculation on the .. ground that kn9wledge of the 
«inner» and the.<~ outer», being subject to di{ferent « metaphy-
&ical » p.rinciples; is incommensutabl~ (.Vol. 1,. pp. 6-7) 32 , But 
little will be gained by a mere r~cjt~tion o.f random points of 
difference. The· central issue of co.(lcern in this article is the 
c.;onception of the nature and methods of psychology. Regar-
ding ithis fundamental issue, the two approaches could not be 
more .different. Fries saw psychology as an empirical science 
;whereas the idealists consid~red it a rational science. To be 
sure; in pmctice the distinctiop. might seem less drastic because 
Fries l1sed im;thods of rational analysis and idealists someti-
mes ,used empirical observations to confirm or illustrate their 
dialectics, but the distinction is nonetheless quite real. Fries 
began ).Vith observations, then used« regressive analysis » of the-
l5e observations to establish rational principles which he then 
used as a basis for further observations .. The idealists, on the 
other hahd, either began with speculative principles and wo'Q'e 
their psychological systems 'Yith deductions and dialectical rea-
soning, or they began with empirical observations (commonly 
view~d as « obstacles » to be ov~rcome by dialectical analysis) 
flQd proceeded beyond the bounds of experience (and often be-
yond afocus-0n the individual) as they devel9ped a philosophy of 
the mil).d ·which traq.scern;led the scop·e of psychology. In either 
~ase'Jhey suportlinated· th,e :empirical study. of tl:ie individual to 
,specqlativ~ .t"easoning, and this is what Fries vociferously oppo-
sed. His own analysis -and use of rational principles, he clai-
med, was always critical and regulatiye, never speculative and 
constitutive. If at times .his ~ritical temper seems from our 
historical vantage poil}t a bit lax, this was the result of the 
execution, not the formulation, of his methodology. 
Iq the realm of conceptual definitions, then, Fries's approa-
ch to psychology was definitely .distinct from the approach of 
the idealists. No matter what similarities may have existed bet-
ween their approaches, idealist psychologists did not formula-
32 Fries admitted a place to « comparative anthropology », the empirical 
science of the correlative changes in mental and physical phenomena, but he 
denied any pos~ibility of deducing from these facts anything regarding the 
metaphysical essence, or relation, of mind and body. 
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te, as did Fries, a new definition of psychology as an indepen-
dent, empirical science. Their role in the development of psycho-
logy deserves more attention than it has received, but in the 
history of the conceptual development of psychology qua scienti-
fic they are less important than Fries. Indeed, Fries's contribu-
tion consisted precisely in producing a definition of psychology 
that served as an alternative to the idealist conception of psycho-
logy as formulated by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel and follo-
wed with more or less consistency by the next generation of 
idealist psychologists (Leary, 1980b). 
As a result, Fries's psychology was not given a rousing welco-
me in the early nineteenth-century heyday of German idealism. 
Fries did have some followers, but few of these devoted them-
selves to developing his psychological doctrines 33 • In fact, the 
most significant influence Fries had, in terms of the ongoing 
conceptual development of psychology, was not upon his avo-
wed disciples, but upon two independent thinkers who, like 
Fries, opposed the dominant idealistic orientation of the time 
and acknowledged Kant among their intellectual forbears 34 • 
To these two men, Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich 
Eduard Beneke, Fries bequeathed the conception of psychology 
as an autonomous and empirical science based upon self-observa-
tion and utilizing regressive analysis and regulative rational prin-
ciples. Neither Herbart nor Beneke accepted this definition of 
psychology in its entirety. Herbart (1824-25), for instance, rejec-
ted regressive analysis and attempted to make psychology into 
a mathematical science as well as into an empirical science a la 
Fries; and Beneke (1845), who accepted what he took to be 
Fries's « psychologistic » starting point, argued in addition that 
33 A notable exception was Heinrich Schmid, whose ( 1834) treatise set 
forth the foundation of Fries's psychology in classic form. Regarding Fries's 
discipleG, see Eggeling ( 1878, p. 79), Erdmann ( 1866; 3d rev. ed., 1878; trans. 
1890, Vol. 3, pp. 109-110), Henke (1867, passim), Steinmetz (1958, p. 394), 
and l1eherweg (1862-66; 12th rev. ed., 1923-:ZS, Vol. 2, p. 203). 
34 Fries's influence upon Rudolf Hermann Lotze also deserves to be men-
tioned. For some of the facets of this influence, see Woodward (1977). A 
fuller discussion of this topic will be found in Woodward's forthcoming intel-
lectual biography of Lotze, now in preparation. It is also appropriate to 
acknowledge the development of a neo-Friesian school of philosophy in the 
early twentieth century (Henry-Hermann, 1967) and the contention that 
Fries's theory of developmental stages (nrunely, sense, habit, and understand-
ing) directly influenced Karl Biihler's later tripartite developmental scheme 
(Wolman, 1968, pp. 240-241); see Nelson ( 1962; trans., 1970-71) and Buhler 
(1918; 9th rev. ed., 1967). 
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the « New Psychology » "tould, and should, become an experi-
mental science. 
These -dev~lop~ts, ·originating from the work of Kant and 
channeled through the work of Fries to that of Herbart and 
Beneke, have been traced elsewhere (I.:eary, in press). The cen-
tral point to be repeated here is that tqese developments led to 
the work of Wilhelm Wundt (1874), who is generally regar-
ded as the founder of modern scientific psycllology. Since the 
time of Wundt, psychology has turned toward a course that is 
now under critical examination (Leary, 1979). It is appropria-
te to conclude this review of Fries's psychology with the com-
mefit· that, as the « cult of empiricism » in psychology slowly 
atrophies (Toulmin & Leary, in press), the wor.k of Fries -
who championed both empiricism and rationalism and saw them 
as intimately connected - might bear closer examination. De-
spite Beneke's « psychologistic » interpretation of Fries's psycho-
logy, Fries himself was not a simple prqponent of psychologism, 
as' has often been assumed 35 • His blending of rational analy-
sis with empiricism suggests at least one alternative epistemo-
logy for contemporary psychology. No doubt the~e are other 
alternativ!!s as well. As psychologists search for these alternati-
ves (see, e. g., Koch & Leary, in pressh it might. be useful for 
them ~o be reminded of Fries and of other aspects of the lost 
heritage of their discipline. While the essential ideas of Fiies 
and others (including Wundt himself)'will certainly not be tran-
slatable, without_·change, into ihe current, developing concep-
tion of psychology as a science, they m€ly offer fresh per~pecti­
ves 'that will reveal « new » avenues leading beyond the positi-
vist framework'that has dominated scientific psychology for so 
lohg, despite the rationalism of its founding fathers - and 
forefathers. 
35 Interestingly, Edmund Husserl (1900), whose phenomenology was based 
on the rejection of psychologism, never mentioned Fries in his work (Welch, 
1941; 2d ed., 1965), which implies that Husserl was a better reader of Fries 
than have been many others. On psychologism, and the assumption that Fries 
was the founder of this « subjectivist » approach to epistemology and logic, see 
Abbagnano (1967). Of course, Fries was a proponent of psychologism to the 
extent that he saw psychology as the most fundamental of all sciences, but he 
was not a simple-minqed proponent of psychologism: he did not advocate the 
reduction of the principles of logic, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, etc., to 
the status of mere accretions of psychological experience. Rather, as we have 
seen, · h~ contended that these principles were discovered in (rather than 
produced by) experience. 
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Summary - Most German philosophers in'the early nineteenth century were 
devoted 'to tl1.e idealistic «completion» of Inunanuel Kant's.critical' philospphy. 
Ai.ew independent.,philosophers, 1:iowever, were preoccupied with the elaboration 
of a non-idealistic, and less speculative, conclusion to Kant's thought. Among 
the '~ii,rliest · opponents iof ,the speculative idealists was Jakob Friedrich Fries, 
one a~ect of ·whose 'influence 1s of particular interest: in his reaction against 
ideali.Sm, and in his own « completion » of Kant, he laid the foundation for the 
development_ and acceptance of psychology as an independent science. 
Maintaining that knowledge of the transcehdent ·is impossjple, Fries concen-
trated; as 'did Kant, upon the: discovery of the critical bases of knowledge. In 
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only that psy<;hology could become a science but that, in fact, psychology is the 
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critical ·philosophy. Having made these argument5> he developed a «psychic 
anthropology» upon which Ire hoped to establish a steady and lasting psychology. 
His efforts inspired subsequent thinkers whos<;. works, in combination with his 
own, led to the emergence· of scientific psychology. Today some of his ideas 
are_ still 'worthy of critical review. 
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